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Introduction 
Based on the experiences of regionalization and integration processes, this paper identifies the 
main transformations North America has undergone as a result of the implementation of NAFTA.  
The main argument is that the operation of NAFTA has set in motion a process of regionalization 
in North America and gradually an increasing number of policies encompass a regional 
dimension.  In such process, the pivotal actor is the United States, while Canada and Mexico are 
reactive partners who seek to defend their domestic interests as well as accommodate themselves 
in the regional dynamic led by the United States.  The emerging regionalism in North America 
reflects that NAFTA has accomplished some of its goals.  Nonetheless, there is an ongoing 
discussion with regard to the expanded agenda of the region and several proposals have been 
brought to the academic and political debate. In this regard, five main sections are considered to 
asses the regionalization of North America. The first introduces some analytical elements about 
the regionalization in North America; the second shows perceptions of public opinion with regard 
to the regional agenda; the third refers to the effects of NAFTA, while the fourth evaluates the 
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SSP) Summits. The fifth presents the case of alternative 
models for the future of NAFTA. 
 1. The Idea of a North America Region: From NAFTA-ization to North Americanization 
NAFTA has set in motion a process of regionalization divided in two main stages: NAFTA-
ization and North-Americanization. Both concepts attempt to reflect the changes in North 
America and are based on the concept of Europeanization, which can be broadly defined as 
bargains between states leading to ongoing political adjustment within states.  In the case of 
Europe, it can refer to the reciprocal influence of European integration and the domestic politics 
of its member states, in either top-down or bottom-up terms.  In fact, the original concept of 
NAFTA-ization is operational for the purposes of studying NAFTA and its reverberations in the 
three economies of the region. Its proponent, Mark Spinwall, defines it as follows: “it is about 
political change, not about social or economic change (such as growth in migration or trade). The 
underlying hypothesis is that regional agreements between states set in motion a process of 
domestic political adjustment, which is likely to vary according to the nature of the agreement.”
1  
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  3  The contribution of Spinwall lies in the study of the effects of NAFTA in the three countries 
and points out that the domestic political adjustments have been more numerous in Mexico and 
Canada than in the United States.  However, in order to reach a more comprehensive perspective 
of North America as a region, there is a conceptual demand to expand the themes of the agenda 
beyond the strict impacts of NAFTA. 
 Along with Spinwall’s conceptualization, from the perspective of this essay NAFTA-ization 
corresponds to the first stage of the regionalization of North America. In this stage, the priority is 
the development of mechanisms and policies aimed at increasing NAFTA related exchanges.  
Unlike the European model, based on a combination of supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions, North America has initially evolved as a region driven by the economic rationale of 
free trade. The Prime Minister of Canada has emphatically reiterated his view in this regard: 
To Harper (Prime Minister of Canada), “there is a clear difference between European 
integration, driven by that of continent’s political and intellectual elites, and North 
American integration, driven by well, by our business elites. It’s not a case of the leaders 
of the countries seeking to impose this upon society and upon the economy… What it is 
the case of is the business community, in particular, increasingly inviting us to cooperate 
more fully and to address a lot of inadequacies in NAFTA.
2
Prime Minister Harper sheds some light about the limitations of NAFTA in comparison to the 
European integration.  However, three observations can be made to his remarks. The first is that 
the concept of integration has several implications from the economic and political standpoints, 
namely, supranational institutions; these elements are absent in the architecture of North America.  
The second is that NAFTA has not been a fixed agreement frozen in time and space; conversely, 
it has impacted a variety of aspects in the economic and political life of the three partners beyond 
the strict business agenda.  
 Thus, the second stage of the regionalization of NAFTA is the North-Americanization of the 
region. Unlike the first stage, in this case, four elements play a crucial role: 1) deeper 
interdependence, 2) NAFTA-related political adjustments, 3) bureaucratic and civil society 
learning process about the region, and 4) the demands for coordination of policies (security) 
beyond the commercial track. Therefore, while there are no prospects of European style 
integration in North America, it could be argued that NAFTA has paved the way for the 
regionalization of North America.   
  In the following sections, this paper will provide some elements to draw some aspects of the 
making of the regional agenda based on perceptions, deeper interdependence, ideas about the 
region and official policies in the regionalization of North America.  
 
2. Perceptions of Public Opinion in North America 
 
One of the expectations of citizens is that their opinions and political preferences will be reflected 
on public policies.  Scholars argue from different standpoints that democracies tend to represent 
the common interest of their constituents. However, it is common that in the complex 
policymaking process there are mismatches between expectations and policies. In the case of 
foreign policy, sometimes the “wisdom” of politicians impregnates policies contrary to the 
opinion of their constituents. The effects can be either harmful (invasion to Iraq) or beneficial 
(European integration) for the society affected by those decisions.  
  Public opinion is a helpful instrument to illustrate how citizens perceive their counterparts in 
the region. How, then, does public opinion perceive NAFTA and North America as a region? 
Based upon several surveys conducted in the three countries, a general trend indicates that public 
opinion tends to see negatively globalization and economic regionalization because both can 
affect local jobs. What is interesting is that most of the legal implementations of NAFTA have 
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  4already taken place and actually economic threats such as outsourcing are more likely with India 
or China.  For instance, in the case of the United States, a 2006 survey conducted by the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations found that with regard to globalization 60% of Americans see 
globalization as mostly good for the United States. However, 49% of Americans say that 
international trade overall is bad for the environment, and 60% say that trade is bad for creating 
jobs within the United States. On the other hand, 67% say it is bad for job security for American 
workers, and 72% say that outsourcing is bad because American workers lost their jobs to people 
in other countries.
3
  On the other hand, a September 2004 survey conducted by Queen’s University School of 
Policy Studies showed that 67% of Canadians found that the irritations of free trade with the 
United States were a cost Canada would have to pay in order to get good access to world 
markets.
4  When asked whether their country was a winner or a loser with regards to NAFTA, a 
2005 survey showed that 60% of Canadians saw their country as a loser, up from 47% in 2002.  
Seventy percent of Canadians support NAFTA, and 75% supports increasing trade between the 
three countries.
5 In the case of Mexico, with regard to NAFTA, 70 percent of the public believes 
that the United States has benefited the most from NAFTA. Forty-four percent believe NAFTA 
has been good for the economy, 50% believe it has been good for business, and 49% it has been 
good for job creation. Sixty-four percent of Mexicans support NAFTA. 
  Beyond the theme of NAFTA, the abrasive role of U.S. foreign policy since 2003 provoked 
negative opinions around the world.  However, in the case of its two neighbors there is a positive 
perception to enhance cooperation in the field of security. From the Canadian perspective, a 2005 
Pew Research Center Survey
6 found that 59% of Canadians have a favorable opinion of the 
United States, down from 72% in 2002. However, in 2005, only 19% of Canadians believed that 
the U.S. foreign policy took the interests of their country into consideration. With regard to 
security, 74% of Canadians believe that Canada should adopt U.S. immigration and import 
control procedures to keep the border between the two countries open.  In the case of Mexico, 
regarding terrorism, Mexicans believe that they should help in the War on Terror in the following 
ways: permit American agents to work with Mexican agents in guarding Mexican airports, ports, 
and borders; increase Mexico’s entrance and exit requirements for people from other countries; 
and increase control on the movement of goods through Mexican airports, ports, and borders.  
 
3. NAFTA: Assessing its effects 
 
Since NAFTA came into force in 1994, there has been a vivid debate about its effects on the three 
countries.  The explanation about it would vary based upon the ideological perspective and the 
selection and use of indexes, dependent and independent variables.  However, the middle ground 
assessment would suggest that both positive and negative effects and that not all the harm in the 
region can be attributed to NAFTA. Table 1 summarizes the main debates about its effects. 
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a
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Table 1. Debates about the effects of NAFTA 
 
NAFTA Debate  Cavanagh and Anderson  Serra and Espinosa 
Wages  11 percent slide in real wages in 
Mexico, manufacturing wages 
lower in 2000 than in 1981. 82 
percent rural poverty rate in Mexico 
(1998) and 58 percent of Mexicans 
live in Poverty (1999). In 1999, 
wages in the factory were at $1.74 
an hour, lower than the national 
wage of $2.12 an hour. 
Wages for 1981 distorted due to over 
inflation of Peso, hourly wages at a 
factory have gained 8.4 percent over 
pre-NAFTA levels. Mexican firms 
exporting more than 80 percent of 
profits paid between 58-67% higher 
wages than average wage rate (1994-
1996). 
Tariffs  US Corn imports have devastated 
small farmers in Mexico. NAFTA 
requires a removal of protectionist 
barriers, which means there will be 
no protections by 2008, and the 
Mexico market will be flooded with 
US Corn. 
Only a certain amount of corn will be 
allowed to enter Mexico duty free; 
the rest is subject to a tariff, which 
amounts to 162 percent of the US 
corn entering Mexico.  
Unions and Labor  The globalized marketplace allows 
employers to suppress the rights of 
workers in Mexico. Attempts to 
unionize are met with violent 
crackdowns by the owners and 
police. The agency set up under 
NAFTA has been unable to hold 
governments or corporations 
responsible for their workers’ rights 
violations. 
NAFTA’s side agreement on labor 
was always intended to protect 
workers’ rights while preventing the 
use of labor-related claims as 
protectionism. Labor unions have 
had greater political independence 
since NAFTA, and were a factor in 
the election of the opposition leader 
in 2000. 
Environment  Mexican government investment in 
environmental protection has 
declined about 45 percent since 
1994, and the NAFTA committee 
only gives $3 million a year in 
funding for projects. Attempts to 
deal with pollution have resulted in 
lawsuits by corporations. 
Public investment has been declining 
due to budgetary restraints. The trade 
liberalization of Mexico will 
eventually lead to more funding for 
environment protection. It is 
important to prevent protectionist 
measures that might be used to 
punish polluters. 
 
        Taken from: J. Enrique Espinosa, Jaime Serra, John Cavanagh, and Sarah Anderson, “Happily Ever NAFTA?”, 
Foreign Policy (September/October 2002), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2458&print=1  
Elaborated by: Carlyn Jorgensen  
 
 In the 1990, Mexico revealed its intention to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United 
States. This decision challenged “all previous conceptions of Mexico-U.S. relations.”
7 Fifteen 
years later, NAFTA has lost its uniqueness since both Mexico and the United States have 
implemented a network of free trade agreements with other countries and regions.  On the other 
                                                           
    
7 Gustavo Vega and Luz María de la Mora, “Mexico’s Trade policy: Financial Crisis and Economic Recovery” in 
Confronting Development. Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Social Policy Challenges, eds. Kevin J. Middlebrook and 
Eduardo Zepeda (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 171. 
  6hand, it has become clear that creating winners and losers is the natural consequence of the logic 
of free markets, and NAFTA is not the exception. Sidney Weintraub has said that “NAFTA has 
not been a panacea… it must be assessed for what it is…. a trade and investment agreement that 
succeeded in its central purpose.”
8
  Most of the publications in this field recognize the successes of NAFTA.  Between 1993 and 
2000, for instance, trade in the NAFTA region increased from $289 billion to $659 billion.  Trade 
flows between the United States and Canada reached $411 billion and between Mexico and the 
United States $263 billion in 2000.  Mexican exports to the United States and Canada grew by an 
outstanding 234 percent and 203 percent respectively between 1993 and 2002.
9  Today, twenty-
two U.S. states have Mexico as either the first or second market for their exports.  For nine others 
Mexico is their third most important export destination.
10 With regard to total FDI flows between 
the three countries, they amounted to $63 billion between 1989 and 1994; during 1995-2000, total 
flows increased to $202 billion, tripling in dollar volume. 
  On the other hand, the connection between trade liberalization and investment growth is 
illustrated by three sectors where commercial ties have been relatively more extensive: the 
automotive industry, textiles and clothing, and the electronic industry. “In these three sectors, 
deeper integration is clearly evident between the three economies.”
11
  However, despite the success indicated by the macroeconomic data, some criticisms emerge 
in the interpretation of these numbers.  For instance, “in the 12 years since NAFTA was ratified, 
the yearly U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and Canada has grown from $9.1 billion to $110.8 
billion.”
12 In this vein, a study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
shows the following findings: a) NAFTA has not helped the Mexican economy keep pace with 
the growing demand for jobs (500,000 jobs were created in manufacturing from 1994 to 2002, 
while the agricultural sector has lost 1.3 million jobs since 1994); b) real wages for most 
Mexicans today are lower than when NAFTA took place (caused by the peso crisis); c) there has 
been an increase in the number of migrants to the United States (although not necessarily as a 
result of NAFTA).
13  
          From the U.S. government’s perspective, officials have admitted the qualified success of 
NAFTA.  As one U.S. official pointed out, “In fact, the result is that NAFTA has been virtually 
job neutral.  Given what most reputable economist say about the employment effects on NAFTA, 
that finding is not surprising.”
14
      Perhaps one of the assessments in which most of the analysts agree is with regard to 
Mexico.  Whereas wages in Mexican export-related industries are 37 percent higher than the rest 
of the economy, 
15 the gap that existed when NAFTA came into effect widened instead of 
narrowed.  In 2001, seven years after the implementation of NAFTA, “Mexican manufacturing 
salaries went from $2.10 an hour versus $11.7 an hour in the United States to $1.90 an hour 
versus $13.80 an hour in the United States.”
16  In March 2005, in the context of the Tri-national 
Summit, Harold Meyerson stated: “Since NAFTA was enacted, real wages for Mexicans have 
                                                           
    
8 Sidney Weintraub, “NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade” in NAFTA’s Impact on North Am    
rica. The First Decade, ed. Sidney Weintraub (Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, 2004), 126. 
    
9 U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA. A Decade of Strengthening a Dynamic Relationship, (2004): 2. 
    
10 NAFTA Works, “Mexico is a Growing Export Market for U.S. States,” vol. 9, issue 9 (September 2004): 1. 
    
11 Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, “NAFTA at Ten: A Mexican View,” Focal Point. Spotlight on the Americas 3, no. 3 
(March 2004): 3. 
    
12 Harold Meyerson, “CAFTA’s Profit Motive,” Washington Post, March 30, 2005. 
    
13 John J. Audley, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Sandra Polaski and Scott Vaughan, NAFTA’s Promise and Reality. 
Lessons from Mexico to the Hemisphere (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2003), 4-7. 
    
14 Grant D. Aldanas, “NAFTA: A Ten Year perspective and Implications for the Future,” Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic, Export and Trade Promotion of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United 
States Senate, April 20, 2004, 7. 
    
15 U.S. Trade Representative, “NAFTA: A Decade of Success,” Fact Sheet on NAFTA Benefits (July 1, 2004). 
    
16 Graciela Bensusán, “Labor Regulation and Trade Union Convergence in North America,” in NAFTA’s Impact on 
North America. The First Decade, ed. Sidney Weintraub (Washington: Center for Strategies Studies, 2004), 126.  
  7declined, the nation’s poverty rate has increased, and illegal immigration to the United States has 
soared.  For both Mexican and American workers, NAFTA has been a lose-lose proposition.  For 
the U.S. corporations that have outsourced their work to Mexico, though, NAFTA has been a 
clear profit center.”
17
Other less quantitative affects should not be overlooked. NAFTA is a very detailed and 
precise agreement, containing 22 chapters and numerous annexes establishing the obligations of 
member states. NAFTA creates strong pressure to harmonize tariff, update rules of origin and 
harmonize other standards in order to promote trade. Legal changes were required in all three 
member states as a result of NAFTA. The three countries scheduled changes in order to 
implement NAFTA provisions. Some examples are the provisions in Chapter 19. However, 
Mexican adjustments were more profound. For instance, national laws were changed in areas 
such as telecommunications, intellectual property rights, automotive sector, competition, 
monetary policy, inward investment, and others.
18 To some extent, this is what Clarkson called 
the “Americanization of Mexican Law.”
19
 
Side Agreements 
 
With regard to the side agreements, most scholars agree that the environmental one - the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)
20 - has had a limited impact on 
the region since it was not designed to significantly reverse the environmental consequences of 
economic growth in Mexico.  However, it may be taken into account as a pilot project to examine 
the effectives of institutions designed for Mexico and other nations where trade-led growth needs 
to be channeled in a more environmentally-friendly fashion. 
One of the parameters for assessing the environmental side agreement is through its 
institutional performance.  The NACEC has two mechanisms that provide additional means to 
monitor the enforcement of environmental laws in North America.  The first mechanism is 
through Article 14 and 15.  Under this mechanism, 43 cases have been filed under articles 14 and 
15 as of February 2004.  There were 7 active files against Mexico, 4 against Canada, and none 
against the United States.  With regard to the closed files, 14 were against Mexico, 10 against 
Canada and 8 against the United States.
21 The second mechanism is Article 22, which allows any 
of the three NAFTA governments to enter into a dispute resolution process with parties that 
persistently fail to enforce environmental laws.  According to Article 22, nations found in 
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18 Mark Spinwall, “NAFTA-ization: Regionalism and Domestic Political Adjustment in the North America Area 
(Paper Presented at the 48
th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 28-March 
3, 2007): 7-8. 
    
19 Stephen Clarkson, “Reforms from Without versus Reform from Within: NAFTA and the WTO’s Role in 
Transforming Mexico’s Economic System” in Mexico’s Politics and Society in Transition, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and 
Andrew D. Selee (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 25-26. 
    
20 North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who we are 
(http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan=english, accessed April 4, 2005) The environmental agreement 
complements some of the provisions of NAFTA. The NAAEC created the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(NACEC), which was established to address regional environmental concerns, help the potential trade and environment 
conflicts, and to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law. 
    
21 Council for Environmental Cooperation, Ten Years of North American Environmental Cooperation (Council for 
Environmental Cooperation, June 15, 2004): 44. Articles 14 and 15 of NAAEC allow citizens to make submissions to 
NACEC regarding the failure of a NAFTA party to enforce its environmental laws. Under articles 14 and 15, if a 
submission is accepted by NACEC, NACEC commissions and publishes a factual record. If a factual record deems that 
environmental law has been continually violated, there are no requirements that action has to be taken. It is hoped that 
increased public attention to the matter will trigger governmental action. 
  8violation can be fined and after a long process can eventually have NAFTA privileges suspended. 
However, this Article has never been invoked.
22   
In addition to the mechanisms, few NACEC’s programs have modestly contributed to 
increased funding, monitoring, and citizen participation. NACEC’s Fund for Pollution Prevention 
Projects in Mexican Small and Medium Size Enterprises (FIPREV), and its North America Fund 
for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC) are both sources of funds for industry and 
communities.
23 In light of the modest contributions of the environmental side agreement, 
Hufbauer and Schott have stated that “without NAFTA, the Mexican government would have had 
less incentive to pass environmental legislation or to improve its enforcements efforts, and the 
achievements, modest though they are, of Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 
NADBank, and BECC would not exist.”
24   
On the other hand, the Commission for Labor Cooperation was created under the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
25 The outcomes of the NAALC have 
been rather disappointing due to both their design as well as implementation.  Some of the 
obstacles are the following: a) there is no intent to harmonize worker’s rights, which allows each 
country to maintain its respective comparative advantages; b) there are no independent powers to 
supervise national authorities in the enforcement of labor laws and regulations; c) restrictions on 
protecting the 11 NAALC principles limit the application of sanctions to only three cases (child 
labor, minimum salaries, and safety and hygiene standards in the workplace) and leave collective 
rights unprotected; d) slowness of the arbitration process, and e) procedural disparity in each of 
the National Administrative Office (NAO).
26     
The NAOs have received a total of 25 complaints.  The distribution of the total number of 
complaints by country from 1995 to 2001 supports the initial assumption that Mexico is the 
country with the greatest challenges in complying with labor laws (16 complaints), followed by 
the United States (7 complaints) and Canada (2 complaints). The decrease in the number of 
complaints (4 in 1994, 1 in 1995, 2 in 1996, 3 in 1997, 10 in 1998, 2 in 1999, 1 in 2000, 2 in 
2001, and none in 2002) demonstrates the loss of interest by trade union organizations in Mexico 
and the United States in testing the effectiveness of this instrument.  In 1998, the NAALC became 
more dynamic because of the intensification of trans-border labor union cooperation.
27  
Some of the concrete achievements resulting from the labor agreement are: pressure on 
Mexican authorities to implement a public registry of collective contracts; the imposition of a fine 
by Mexican authorities against a company (Hang Young) due to a violation of safety and hygiene 
standards; easing of the pregnancy testing requirement in maquiladoras; easing the practice of 
denouncing a worker’s migratory status by work inspectors in the United States.
28
 
4. Security and Prosperity Partnership 
 
                                                           
22 Kevin P. Gallagher, Free Trade and the Environment. Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 77. 
23 Ibid, 75. 
24 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, North American Environment Agreement Under NAFTA (Washington: 
Institute of International Economics, 2002). 
25 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) (http://www.naalc.org/, accessed Juanuary 23, 
2005). The Commission is formed of a Council of Ministers, a cabinet-level body in charge of policy-setting and 
decision-making consisting of the three labor ministers or their representatives; and a trinational Secretariat that 
provides support to the Council and to the independent Evaluation Committees of Experts and Arbitral Panels the 
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National Administrative Offices (NAOs), created by each government within their own labor ministry to implement the 
NAALC. 
    
26 Bensusán, 128-129. 
    
27 Bensusán, 130. 
    
28 Bensusán, 131. 
  9At the decision-making or governmental level, the prescription is that North America needs a 
cautious adaptation.  On March 23, 2005, Presidents Bush and Fox and Prime Minister Martin 
announced the establishment of the “Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America.”
29  
Unlike lofty official declarations, it is remarkable that ministerial-level working groups were 
established to identify concrete, measurable and achievable steps towards the Partnership’s goals.  
By June 2005, the ministers will issue their initial reports and thereafter the groups will report 
semi-annually.  
  One of the most relevant statements of the Partnership is the “Two-Speed European Style.” 
The document considers that “The Partnership is trilateral in concept; while allowing any two 
countries to move forward on an issue, it will create a path for the third to join later.” Likewise, 
the official proposal does not include any reference to migration or institutional development of 
any kind.  
  As indicated in its title, the North American partnership is divided into two sections.  The 
first focuses on common security encompassing the following aspects: a) implementing common 
border security and bio-protection strategies; b) enhancing critical infrastructure protection, and 
implementing a common approach to emergency response; c) implementing improvements in 
aviation and maritime security, combating transnational threats and enhancing intelligence, and d) 
implementing a border-facilitation strategy to improve the legitimate flow of people and cargo.  
The second part of the partnership highlights four aspects of economic prosperity: a) improving 
productivity through regulatory cooperation to generate growth; b) promoting collaboration in 
energy, transportation, financial services, technology; c) reducing the cost of trade through the 
efficient movement of goods and people; and d) creating safer and more reliable food supply 
while facilitating agricultural trade and enhancing the stewardship of the regional environment. 
        It is interesting to note that the in the process of regionalization the trilateral annual meetings 
have become part of the agenda.  The last meeting of the leaders was held in Cancun, Mexico, in 
March 2006, and the next meeting is set for sometime in 2007 in Ottawa, Canada. In Cancun, the 
three leaders discussed economic integration of the three countries, border security, energy 
security, emergency management, strengthening competitiveness through the North American 
Competitiveness Council, and preparing for the Bird Flu and other pandemics.
30
        As a preface of the trilateral meeting in Canada, in February 2007 in Ottawa, U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice, Canadian Minister of Affairs, Peter MacKay, and Mexican Secretary 
of Foreign Relations, Patricia Espinosa, met to discuss the issues they felt were important for the 
upcoming summit. The issues they discussed included public health problems, environmental 
threats, natural disasters, clean energy, and combating criminal organizations. At a press 
conference, Secretary Rice stated that the United States and Mexico are concerned about each 
other’s prosperity, and that in order to solve the problem of illegal immigration into the US, it is 
important to bring prosperity and development to Mexico so Mexicans can work in their country 
and provide for their families. The three also answered questions about Iran and the role of 
Canada and Mexico in the War on Terror.
31
  Although it is still early to asses their scope, there are three intergovernmental regional 
institutions that may catalyze the interconnections in the area. The first is the North American 
Competitiveness Council was created to consider issues that could be addressed on a trilateral or 
bilateral level, provide long-term advice, provide input on compatibility of the security and 
prosperity agendas, and offer ideas on the private sector’s role in promoting North American 
Competitiveness.  
  The second is the North American Energy Working Group- this was organized in 2001 and 
incorporated as part of the SPP in March 2005. The NAWEG has nine expert groups working on 
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 10areas such as electricity, energy efficiency, hydrocarbons, natural gas trade, nuclear collaboration, 
oil sands, regulatory experts, and science and technology. The third is the North American Steel 
Trade Committee (NASTC) - this was formed in 2002, and incorporated into the SPP into March 
2005. The NASTC is supposed to direct and launch a North American steel strategy to deal with 
the global steel market and government interference into it. It is supposed to work with the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to eliminate distortions 
negatively affecting the North American steel markets. 
 
5. Some alternative projects about the region 
 
In the middle of the first decade of the 21
st Century, there is a pervasive perception that free trade 
is not enough for North America. Unlike the late 1990s, this debate is not confined to university 
classrooms.  Under different scientific assumptions and political motivations, most of the 
epistemic communities conceive a new stage in North America’s regional development; this 
phase could be predicted in a minimalist fashion, namely, proposing a superficial adaptation of 
NAFTA, or in maximalist mode suggesting a European Union like entity, or a combination of 
both.   
In the academic world, the debate on North American integration has been nurtured by a 
variety of scholars. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Gustavo Vega-Cánovas elaborated the concept of 
the Common Frontier, which “… should be a work in progress for at least a decade, to foster 
closer integration of North America while preserving the essential sovereignty of each partner.”
32  
Their proposal encompasses three main topics: border management, defence alliance and 
immigration. 
With regard to border management, the premise is that security must start at the point of 
origin, rather than at the point of destination.  This assumption has been indirectly applied in 
North America in cases such as the U.S. meat inspectors that routinely visit Canadian packing 
plants or the U.S. agricultural inspectors posted at Mexican avocado orchards.  The second point 
develops the idea of a strong defence for all modes of entry into the perimeter (NAFTA area), 
considering four aspects: a) intelligence sharing is a precursor of everything else; b) NAFTA 
partners should seek agreement on circumstances that justify electronic surveillance of suspects 
within the common frontier; c) NAFTA partners should define circumstances when a NAFTA 
arrest warrant can be issued to detain a suspect anywhere within the common frontier; and c)  
NAFTA coast guard services need to enhance their cooperation. 
Although immigration is not part the official trilateral agenda, Hufbauer and Vega-Cánovas 
provide a pragmatic approach to enhance cooperation in order to diminish the automatic link 
between Mexican undocumented migrants and insecurity. They consider an initial division 
between non-NAFTA and NAFTA citizens.  In the case of non-NAFTA nationals, the authors 
state that NAFTA partners should a) revise their visa policies jointly with the intention to 
synchronize program criteria, agreeing on an acceptable country list and length of stay, and b) 
create a special NAFTA force to handle all third country immigration controls at the individual’s 
first airport of entry into NAFTA space.  On the other hand, at least three options are considered 
for NAFTA nationals: a) creating an efficient system for handling legitimate travelers among the 
three NAFTA countries, b) making it easier for NAFTA citizens to retire anywhere in North 
America, and c) increasing the number of legal visas (300,000) on skills basis. 
In Canada, the debate on the future of North America has been triggered by the Big Idea, 
proposed by Wendy Dobson.
33  She argues that Canada and Mexico should facilitate U.S security 
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 11goals, and in return the United States should commit to maintaining open borders even in the 
aftermath of an attack.  Specifically, she recommends the consideration of a “strategic bargain,” a 
“pragmatic mix of customs-union-like and common market-like proposals plus Canadian 
initiatives” in areas of strength that are of particular interests for Americans.  In the case of the 
U.S.-Canadian security relationship, Dobson proposes the following: a) investing in the border in 
order to have a more secure border with less obstacles; b) mutual recognition of the security of 
immigration from third countries; c) energy as part of bilateral security; and d) more active role 
for Canada on bilateral military defence.
34 On the other hand, she states that “we (Canadians) 
should proceed bilaterally but be open to including Mexico when it makes sense.”
35
Contrary to Dobson, Charles Barnett and Hugh Williams
36 have rejected the Big Idea 
approach.  They submit that engaging in high-profile bilateral negotiations may well be a 
disadvantage for the weaker state, Canada.  They urge a bilateral process where the issues are 
addressed in an incremental and pragmatic manner.  In this regard, they summarize their approach 
by focusing on the following areas: a) expanding successful approaches, such as the Smart Border 
Declaration; b) encouraging security cooperation; c) working towards a common external tariff; 
and d) identifying mutual interest in international trade negotiations. 
  Along the same lines, in 2003 the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) presented 
a strategy for advancing the Canadian-United States relationship.  This strategy, entitled “Security 
and Prosperity: The Dynamics of a New Canada-United States Partnership in North America” or 
“Treaty of North America,” is based on five interlocking pillars: reinventing the border; 
maximizing economic efficiencies; building on resource security; sharing in continental and 
global security; and developing new institutions for managing the bilateral relationship.   
  For the CCCE, a European-style institutional arrangement characterized by supranational 
institutions is not the option.  Under intergovernmental premises, they suggest three elements in 
the future institutional framework of North America.  First, at the political level it must have the 
direct involvement of the President and the Prime Minister.  Second, it should not create 
bureaucratic superstructures.  Third, based upon the International Joint Commission for Boundary 
Waters between Canada and the United States, the creation of specialized joint commissions to 
foster bilateral cooperation.
37 Another remarkable feature of the CCCE proposal is the exclusion, 
at least temporarily, of Mexico.  In view of one of its architects, “we (Canadians) recognize that 
in the post-9/11 world, the United States faces distinctly different challenges along its northern 
border with Canada than along the Rio Grande… In the longer term, trilateral solutions may be 
feasible even for difficult issues such as immigration controls, and all three partners certainly 
should continue efforts to build on NAFTA.  The reality, though, is that the most urgent issues 
confronting Canada and the United States must be handled in the near term on bilateral basis.”
38
  Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott have also reacted to Dobson’s approach.  They have 
offered “more than enough advice on the substance of a North American initiative.”
39 In their 
view, rather than the ambitious vision of Dobson’s strategic bargain, the United States “will 
remain focused primarily on security issues, and to lesser extent on energy policy.” Thus, a 
practical step forward for North American integration could include: a) a common external tariff, 
b) U.S. and Canadian joint cooperation work to enhance energy supply, c) financial assistance to 
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 12tackle environmental problems on the Mexican side of the border, and d) a joint Canadian-
Mexican proposal for deeper economic integration. 
  On the other hand, there are other ideas regarding the transformation of NAFTA on very 
specific issues.  One of them surrounds the issue of energy in North America, which has been 
present in the agendas of the presidents of Mexico and the United States and in some of the above 
mentioned proposals.  When George Bush and Vicente Fox met in Guanajuato, Mexico, in 
February 2001, they issued a joint statement that called for “a North American approach to the 
important issue of energy resources.” What does this mean? It has been acknowledged that the 
creation of a North American energy area would lessen the US dependency on Middle East as 
well as Venezuelan oil.  In order to surmount this obstacle, Castaneda and Garnels propose “a 
North American Energy Security Fund, overseen by an independent and transparent board, which 
could be established to issue  $75 billion of securities backed by oil revenues (not the oil itself) to 
finance the rapid expansion of Mexico’s oil production, leading to the doubling of exports by 
2010.”
40  
Contrary to minimalist approaches to integration in North America, in a very comprehensive 
proposal, Robert Pastor presents the North American Community. Considering the pros and cons 
of European integration, the North American Community would emphasize institutional 
development at the regional level as well as the creation of compensatory mechanisms to reduce 
the gap between Mexico and its two NAFTA partners.  In this regard, three institutions could be 
created.  Unlike the European Commission, a North American Commission should be “lean and 
advisory, made up of just 15 distinguished individuals, five from each country.”  Likewise, a 
single North American Inter-Parliamentary Group would merge the bilateral inter-parliamentary 
groups with a problem solving approach.  The third institution would be a Permanent Court on 
Trade and Investment, which would “permit the accumulation of precedent.” Along with these 
institutions, a North American Customs Union and a North American Customs and Immigration 
Force would contribute to enhance trade exchanges and security.  Perhaps one of the most 
important features of this proposal is the North American Investment Fund that would invest 
$200 billion in infrastructure over the next decade on the condition that Mexico increases its tax 
revenues from 11 to 16 percent of its GDP.
41
 
Final thoughts  
 
Twenty years ago, the intent of this article perhaps would be centered on the problematic 
cooperation between North and South as reflected in the relationship between Mexico and the 
United States.  A decade ago, the inquiries might have been focused on the uncertainties of the 
nascent North American Free Trade Agreement.  In 2005, it is accepted by most scholars and 
decision-makers that NAFTA must be revisited. 
The options for North America analyzed in this paper resemble the old and new European 
debates about regional integration.  On the one hand, there are the skeptical ideas which reject 
regional formulas entailing any evolution beyond free trade.  Historically, sooner or later, such 
ideas eroded and were eventually replaced by more integration-oriented approaches in the 
European experience.  On the other hand, regionally oriented perspectives that privilege 
collective solutions for facing the challenges of an interdependent world have shown that 
integration is possible.  A similar debate along these lines is currently taking place in North 
America. 
Despite the disagreements in the proposals for North America, there is also some consensus 
that we can foresee as taking place in the short term.  A “selective customs union” and further 
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 13cooperation in the security seem to be at the forefront of the pragmatic agenda.  Other attempts in 
this direction may have already started in an embryonic fashion, such as the reports to the three 
Executives that will be delivered next June in the context of the North American Partnership. 
Perhaps in 2010 the substance of a seminar like this will be different, hopefully more focused in 
deepening integration in North America.  
 
 
 
 14